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Summary 
Financial rating agencies are key actors of financial markets. Their different 
ratings are usually pre-conditions for issuing securities or bonds. If they assess 
the financial viability of the financial instruments issued, they also assess the 
soundness of the legal arrangements used. Thus, taking the law into account is 
a key element of their assessment. At a macro level, their ratings may express 
an opinion of the economic attractiveness of a territory. The same may apply to 
the legal framework used by issuers. Surprisingly, the literature on this topic 
reveals to be scarce. This paper aims at fulfilling this gap1. 
It studies, in particular thanks to interviews, how rating agencies consider the 
law while rating a country, an enterprise or a financial structured instrument. 
One of the hypotheses we wanted to test was whether financial rating agencies 
use synthetic indicators of law and institutions effectiveness such as those of 
IFC (World Bank Group) Doing Business annual reports and if there are biases 
for or against certain legal traditions. Firstly, this study assesses the relatively 
informal methodology used by the rating agencies to assess the “quality” of the 
legal framework of instruments issued on markets. Secondly, the study reveals 
in particular the existence of several biases: a general prejudice against Case 
law and a specific bias in favour of Common Law jurisdiction. This study re-
veals that, on average, due to the limitations of the ranking used by rating a-
gencies, all other things being equal, corporations or bonds issued from count-
ries unduly ranked should suffer from this prejudice. The paper tries to 
quantify the sensitivity of rating models to the assessment of the “quality” of 
the legal environment. Finally, this paper considers what regulation framework 
would help to cope with the exhibited drawbacks and to improve the fairness 
and the effectiveness of the rating process.  
                                                
1 This paper draws from a more comprehensive report written in French for the “Economic 
Attractiveness of Law” research program under the direction of B. du Marais with the same 
co-authors and Hubert de Vauplane (General Counsel, CALYON Credit Agricole), and with 
the research assistance of PhD Students F. Besson (Economist, Matisse, University of Paris I), 
E. Suel (Lawyers, CRDP, University of Paris X Nanterre) and P. Froute (Economist, Univer-
sity of Paris I and ESSEC). The “Economic Attractiveness of Law” research program is partly 
financed by the “GIP Mission de recherche Droit et Justice”. 
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I. Section I: Introduction 
A. The goal of the paper  
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) are key players for the regulation of financial 
markets. Their different ratings are usually pre-conditions for issuing securities 
or bonds. If they assess the financial viability of the financial instruments is-
sued, they also assess the soundness of the legal arrangements used. Thus, as-
sessing the soundness of the legal instruments is a key element of their ratings. 
At a macro level, especially for sovereign bonds, their ratings may express an 
opinion on the economic attractiveness of a territory, if not on the level of the 
Rule of Law. Economic competitiveness (for a firm or a country) is increas-
ingly resorting to intangible parameters that are related to the legal and institu-
tional environment of the economic transactions: “governance matters”.2
Therefore, the collection of opinions of CRAs on the law used by issuers from 
a certain country may be a good proxy of the attractiveness of its legal frame-
work. 
From an analytical point of view, the so-called “Law and finance” literature 
from the LLSV team3 has shown the relationships between the legal frame-
work and the development of financial markets. A key determinant of the 
growth of financial markets is said to be the legal origins of financial law. To 
belong to the common law tradition should be an asset for financial transacti-
ons, and hence to economic development. More generally, LLSV’s results con-
firm other analyses that show that common law provides a better environment 
for economic transactions, since it is supposed to better secure property rights: 
legal origins matter.4 Following this results, several authors5 and institutions6
have built composite indicators in order to capture the effect of legal systems 
on economic development. They thus switched from correlation to causality, 
yet using a rather questionable methodology.7
The main goal of the present paper is to assess whether CRAs share these jud-
gements and if they also demonstrate the superiority of common law through 
                                                
2
 KAUFMAN and al. (1999). 
3
 LA PORTA, LOPEZ DE SILANES, SHLEIFER and VISHNY (1998). 
4 GLAESER and SHLEIFER (2002). 
5
 See DJANKOV and al. (2006). 
6
 See World Bank (2003). 
7
 MÉNARD; DU MARAIS (2006). 
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the sound and rigorous assessment that CRAs are supposed to do with the legal 
arrangements used by issuers. 
We then investigate three main issues: 
• How (CRAs) actually assess the “quality” of the legal arrangements u-
sed by issues? What is their methodology in this respect? 
• More specifically, are these governance composite indexes – especially 
the Doing Business index published by the IFC (World Bank Group)8 - 
used by the CRAs to build their rating? 
• And more generally, are CRAs neutral or biased for any specific legal 
tradition or legal instruments? 
B. The methodology 
Our methodology is a standard one. We used interviews of a sample of stake-
holders: the three major CRAs (Standard & Poor, Moody’s and FitchRatings) 
operating in France and some non credit rating agencies (NCRAs) involved in 
socially responsible investment; top managers of all kind of issuers (sovereign, 
corporate and also structured finance issuers); attorneys and managers of the 
regulators. These interviews led to focus on some case studies. We identify a 
few examples where CRAs had a specific and recordable influence on the evo-
lution of substantive law itself. This qualitative survey has been supplemented 
by a principle component analysis of the ranking and methodology used by one 
of the 3 main CRAs (FitchRatings) for assessing one of the key parameters of 
the ranking: the soundness of national bankruptcy law. One has to stress that, 
due to budgetary constraints; this research has only been done on France. By 
another caveat, we should stress the difference we identified between CRAs 
and NCRAs. Since this paper focuses on CRAs, we would only refer interested 
readers to the extended version of the research9. 
This research focus on the influence of CRAs on the access to market. On se-
condary market, the fluid functioning of the fin market should compensate for 
the bias: notably thanks to arbitrage activity and the competitive incentives 
between the three CRAs. 
                                                
8
 World Bank (2003). 
9
 See the full report in French, available on demand at aed@u-paris10.fr and to be published in 
 September 2007 by La documentation française: www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr. 
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However, the latter point remains problematic in our view, indeed if all agen-
cies possess exactly the same bias, then competitive process would be insuffi-
cient to correct it. Thus it can only be corrected through arbitrage processes. 
Section II identifies the issues at stake, namely the effect of CRAs opinion on 
the legal arrangements used by issuers, from a scientific, then financial and 
finally regulatory points of view. Section III develops our findings. Through 
specific cases studies, we confirm that CRAs play a role in terms of recom-
mending, at least indirectly, specific legal arrangements due to some unquesti-
oned bias against some other legal arrangements. This is all the more troubling 
that we found their methodology rather loose, if not some time lacking transpa-
rency. In particular, we identified at least some instances where CRAs use very 
questionable indicators of the quality of law. Section IV draws the conclusions 
of these findings in terms financial market regulation and further research. 
II. Section II: the issues at stake 
From a scientific point of view and surprisingly, the literature on this topic 
reveals to be scarce. This paper aims at fulfilling this gap. From a financial 
point of view, the stakes are paramount since financial rating directly determi-
nes the financial cost for the issuer if not the mere ability to issue a financial 
product. From a regulatory point of view, the stakes also are high since CRAs 
are more and more often called upon to be part of the regulatory framework of 
the financial market, especially with the implementation of the Basel II con-
vention in the realm of banking. 
A. The relative lack of literature on the legal component of 
financial rating 
If the literature concerning the history and the functioning of CRAs, as well as 
the literature on the relevance of ratings are relatively abundant, we found qua-
si nothing concerning their legal components. Admittedly, since transparency 
injunctions made by the IOSCO (International Organization of Securities 
Commissions) in 2004, CRAs disseminate some information through docu-
ments like European legal criteria from Standard & Poor’s. But this informati-
on is very often confined in the statement of general principles which do not 
make possible to look further inside the “black box” of the rating process and 
methodology. Some works assess the role of Law into ratings but for country 
risk ratings, as with the International country risk guide, as assessed by GUES-
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SOUM (2004). However, these ratings are usually seldom used by financial 
market operators. The other works we consulted dealt with the question in a 
broader way. They were concerned with taking into account institutions accor-
ding to a methodology very close to the Law and Finance stream. For instance, 
Godlewski shows that the ratings are consistent with the results of La Porta et 
al.10 This last result consolidated us in our project to study if the observed cor-
relations were due to the use by CRAs of existing indicators potentially fraught 
with some biases or if they resulted from an autonomous, yet convergent ana-
lysis carried out by CRAs. This question can be summarized in the following 
alternative: Are CRAs using a wrong methodology in aggregating and inter-
preting legal data or are they using misleading data? 
B. A financial stake for rated entities  
Needless to say, the impact of the rating, expressed in “notches” (as AAA, 
AA+, etc.) by the three major CRAs, is paramount for an issuer on the financi-
al markets, especially with the view to accessing to investors. 
The rating has a direct effect on the cost of the funds levied on the markets. 
Sometimes, to get a poor rating actually leads to cancel the issuance of a secu-
rity or a bond, because of the reluctance of investors to buy low rated papers. 
For corporations, being downgraded can accelerate bankruptcy. Therefore, if 
CRAs have an unjustified bias against some specific legal arrangements or 
legal traditions, this bias may have a direct negative effect on the balance sheet 
of issuers, but also may prevent investors to benefit from otherwise sound fi-
nancial opportunities. One can argue that market mechanisms should lead pur-
chasers to demand these instruments because they would get higher interest 
rate and consequently lower price. Put it another way, arbitrage and incentives 
should correct the gap. The existence of such corrective mechanisms is an im-
portant issue and should deserve attention. Nevertheless, one can presume that 
they are not short term mechanisms. Since our study focuses on the access to 
market, therefore we put aside this point.  
One can also argue that if such a bias exists, then it would be rarely equally 
expressed by all three agencies. The competition in the market for rating will 
then correct this bias because the biased agencies will have a strong incentive 
to improve their methodology and suppress their bias. However, if the intensity 
of competition in this market seems to grow, it remains an oligopolistic com-
                                                
10 GODLEWSKI (2004). 
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petition. Moreover, there is a risk that all major agencies possess the same bi-
as. In this regard, many researches traditionally show a strong correlation be-
tween the ratings given by the three major agencies.11 Therefore, if this bias is 
constant and uniformly shared by the CRAs, then the fin market will itself fol-
low this bias. Issuers and buyers will not be able to correct this bias and the 
access constraint will remain. 
Our analysis focuses on identifying the sensitivity of the rating to the nature of 
the law used by issuers.12
C. Regulatory stakes: an apparent paradoxical situation 
In the regulatory field, what is striking is the apparent paradox between the 
relatively loose regulation of CRAs and their growing role as part of the regu-
lation system.  
1. A growing recourse to financial rating agencies 
Recent legislative reforms have granted the CRAs a quasi regulatory function. 
In French law, vehicles for securitization (“fonds commun de créances”) are 
compelled to be rated before being listed.  
To a lower extent, the same pattern arises in other segments of the financial 
market. The Euronext regulation points at the possibility to ask to be rated be-
fore listing a security. The same optional power is discretionarily granted to 
the French regulator on all markets.  
In the US, the SEC grants the quality of nationally recognized statistical rating 
organization (NRSRO). 
However, the CRAs’ role has greatly expanded with the Basel II convention. 
Although optional, they now have a major role in certifying the quality of the 
internal process to monitor risks.  
2. The relative lack of liability and regulation 
From a theoretical point of view, all the above mentioned flaws in the metho-
dology should be compensated for by an ex post liability mechanism. Despite 
                                                
11 Among others: CANTOR and PACKER (1996); GESSOUM (2004). 
12 See section III, paragraph C. below. 
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this growing regulating function, CRAs still enjoy a relatively total freedom. 
Their status as new agencies in the US gives very little room for suing them for 
liability. The NRSRO qualifying process has long been an assessment process 
rather than a monitoring process. On an international basis, IOSCO “Code of 
Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating”13 is not really legally binding. 
However, one can notice a recent evolution towards a more stringent regulato-
ry framework. In the EU, directives 2003/6/CEE and 2003/125/CEE hint at 
CRAs and identify room for potential liability. In the US, the recent Credit 
Rating Agency Reform Act, 2006 establishes a registration process for CRAs. 
So the situation is evolving rather rapidly in terms of how the CRAs may be 
regulated. 
This apparent paradox does not raise any question as long as CRAs are using a 
sound and neutral methodology in order to assess an operation. This is the 
question we raised in the realm of the legal field.
III. Section III: Description of the findings: a questionable 
methodology 
A. A rather non transparent methodology  
As a caveat, we should stress that we do not use the words “transparency” and 
“transparent” in any derogatory meaning. Legally speaking, transparency 
means a certain set of procedures. As an example, in order to define this con-
cept, we can use the European court of justice case law on public procure-
ment14. We could then define here transparency as a combination of:  
• a published methodology, devised after discussion with stakeholders;  
• an automatic decision process according to this methodology, enforcing 
the non discrimination principle;  
• and, most of the time, an appeal process abiding by the “fair trial” prin-
ciple. 
The activity of rating agencies and more particularly the rating process is not 
subjected to particular procedural requirements. Indeed, if the IOSCO enumer-
                                                
13
 IOSCO, Technical committee (2004.). 
14
 See, for instance: ECJ, 7 December 2000, Teleaustria. 
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ates a series of principles relative to the “Quality of the rating process”,15 those 
remain very general and do not directly relate to the process to be followed to 
give a rating. Thus our working group conducted a series of interviews in or-
der to open the apparent “black box” of the rating methodology. 
1. The rating methodology: general overview 
Generally speaking, rating results from a collegial decision made by several 
analysts who are internal experts.16 But the method employed by rating agen-
cies remains relatively not procedural, for instance, the composition of the ex-
perts committee is not always the same and varies according to the sector, the 
geographical area, competences, etc.17 It differs from one agency to another.18
The rating is then permanently monitored by the agencies in order to account 
for the evolution of the credit quality. The note could be modified according to 
internal as well as external new information. This calls into question in more 
details how rating agencies assess the legal environment. 
2. Rating the law: a surprisingly “handicraft” process
When assessing the legal framework of a rated entity, the method also relies on 
committees, like the production of the whole rating itself. There are of course 
differences between agencies. However, the major differences lye in the meth-
odology used according to the nature of the entity rated – from sovereign debt 
to structured finance product. 
a) The internal management of the legal function within the CRAs 
Concerning the legal aspects of the rating, and more generally of the institutio-
nal setting, the common pattern is that, although each agency heavily relies on 
external legal advisory services, it also devotes specific means to the legal 
component of the rating. However, internal legal services appear to be of small 
scale. Despite the small size of these services, one finds significant differences 
between each rating agency. For instance, one agency has twelve lawyers, an-
                                                
15 IOSCO (2004). 
16 B. QUENTIN, Les agences de notation, Revue de Droit Bancaire et Financier, No. 6, 
 nov./déc. 2004, p. 465. 
17
 Rapport AMF sur les agences de notation pour l’année 2004 (31 janvier 2005), p. 48. 
18 All the information concerning the practical application of legal criteria and referred to in this 
article can be found on Internet websites of the three agencies (Moody's: www.moodys.com, 
Standard & Poor's: www.standardandpoors.com; FitchRatings: www.fitchratings.com). 
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other has three lawyers for European cases and six devoted for cases concern-
ing the rest of the world. 
b) The focus on legal issues according to the nature of rated entity: the 
emblematic case of structured finance  
If rating agencies apprehend differently the legal factor, one can also note the 
existence of methodological divergences according to the kind of rated object. 
Thus, especially as regard sovereign rating (and to a lesser extent, for corpo-
rate rating), legal factors have a narrow influence on the final rating. 
This contrasts with the case of new financial instruments in the field of structu-
red finance, in particular for securitization operations, where the legal frame-
work plays a much bigger role, if not crucial. Indeed, for this kind of operati-
on, the arranger which makes the transaction chooses the legal environment, 
and often the legal jurisdiction, in which the transaction will be held. This 
choice may be derived from the level of the rating, which itself is based on the 
assessment of the soundness of the legal arrangements by the agencies. 
Rating agencies have thus been forced to develop new tools to gradually ap-
prehend these new and diverse financial products. The agencies now have ana-
lysts specifically assigned to securitization operations. Their operating mode is 
similar with the general rating process described above. 
To assess the legal framework, the agencies frequently employ a small group 
of external law firms in order to obtain a precise description of the legal risks 
and a legal opinion on the quality of the true sale. The role of these practising 
lawyers is thus very important and rating agencies are largely dependant on 
their legal opinion. 
Three patterns are particularly striking. First, the agencies oligopoly is mirro-
ring with a similar oligopoly of lawyers. The arguments behind are: 1/ that this 
oligopoly is due to the sophistication of the legal arrangements used and 2/ by 
a “regulation by reputation” process. 
Second, although the CRAs may hire their own attorneys, they most of the 
time rely on the issuers’ attorneys. Third, the assessment process is that of a 
bilateral bargaining between the agency and the external attorney. The bargain 
is based on two parameters: the capacity of the attorney to persuade its coun-
terpart in the CRAs, and the precision of the wording used to draft its legal 
opinion. 
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As a matter of fact, these legal opinions are a way for the CRAs to pass their 
liability through onto that of the lawyers. This is especially the case since these 
external attorneys are not formally contractors of the CRAs but of the issuers. 
The question is of course how this methodology is actually implemented, what 
are its results and especially if this process does not generate structural biases. 
Clearly, there is no reason to suspect the skills and professionalism of the la-
wyers involved externally as issuers’ attorneys. As well, the professionalism 
and knowledge of the internal legal counsels are unanimously praised. Some-
times, they were among the best issuers’ attorneys before being hired by agen-
cies to test the quality of legal opinions. 
However, our inquiry shows that this methodology does not prevent the rating 
process to be exempted from prejudices according to the origin of the legal 
framework. We tried to identify these prejudices, if not quantify them. 
B. The effect of qualitative biases 
The assessment of qualitative biases is a complex issue. This section is divided 
in two parts. First presents our main findings. Second discusses them in respect 
of the main debates of the law and economics theory. 
1. Findings 
Our research showed that, generally speaking, CRAs have an indirect, yet 
strong influence on the choice of the legal arrangements used by issuers. From 
a practical point of view, yet indirectly, CRAs issue implicit prescription in 
favour of certain specific legal arrangements coming from specific legal tradi-
tions. This normative process is implicit to the extent that no agency positively 
recommends any kind of legal instruments. Since their role is to assess the 
soundness of a legal arrangements or framework, their assessment works as a 
“pass or fail” test. Therefore, it is more from their rejection statements that one 
can derive what patterns are the most preferred by CRAs. And since these re-
jection statements finally lead to a change in the statute law, the normative im-
pact of CRAs can be monitored through explicit reforms of law. 
Through interviews corroborated by a review of the legal literature, we’ve i-
dentified such influence in at least three cases related to the recent evolution of 
French Law:19
                                                
19 We once again refer the reader to the full paper in French. 
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• pertaining to the so-called “solidarité de place”: a specific systemic 
banking solidarity enforced by the Governor of the French Central bank 
according to the then art 52 of the 1984 Banking Act; pertaining to the 
so-called “comptes d’affectation spéciales”: a commonly agreed system 
which allows, under specific and precise conditions, incomes from 
customers to fall out of the scope of bankruptcy law;  
• pertaining to a category of hybrid capital bonds: the “titre super subor-
donné à durée indeterminée”. 
The conclusions of our research can be briefly summarized as follow. In these 
instances, CRAs are enforcing an asymmetric approach: in favour of written 
law rather than case law, and in favour of British or US law rather than French 
law. 
If a legal arrangement is supported by a long standing and consistent case law 
from the French Supreme Court, then a) CRAs will need to have this arrange-
ment confirmed by a statute law to waive their no objection statement and b), 
however, CRAs do not impose the same precautions as far as British or US 
case law is concerned. One has to stress that, in the case of “comptes 
d’affectation spéciales”, the legal arrangements proposed by the issuers was 
using a long standing – at least a decade old – case law from the Cour de cas-
sation, the French Supreme court, but in another realm. So the soundness and 
the effectiveness of this arrangement was very little put into question in the 
legal community. 
Of course, the test carried out by CRAs may prove highly necessary. As a mat-
ter of fact, the example of the “solidarité de place” system demonstrates that 
CRAs may play a very efficient and useful “screening function”. According to 
art. 52 of the Banking Act, this system imposed to all banks operating in Fran-
ce to rescue a failing bank when “invited” to do so by the Central Bank gover-
nor. CRAs have never been convinced by the effectiveness of such an obliga-
tion and by the obligation of the Governor to use this measure. And actually, 
the effect on banks of the 1990s real-estate crisis proved that they were right. 
From another point of view, the reluctance of CRAs towards some specific 
legal arrangements may express the mere effect of the role of rating agencies. 
Since they give information on the probability of the issuer to default or of the 
bond holder to get a fair repayment in such case, they can not be blamed to 
tend to be overcautious. 
However, we tried to check if this cautiousness is based on sound legal analy-
sis and may not be systematically framed, from a quantitative point of view. 
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2. Discussion 
Our findings reveal that CRAs tend to give an excessive weight to legislative 
statutes. The rationale behind may be that legislative statutes enhance the legal 
certainty because they are more stable than case law and are less subject to 
interpretation. However, this argument proves to be problematic because legis-
lative statutes do not constitute a guarantee against future misinterpretation by 
judges. We refer here to the traditional debate between “law in the books” and 
ex post enforcement of law.20
This debate echoes traditional posnerian discussion between the relative eco-
nomic capacities of common law and civil judges. According to the posnerian 
initial approach, common law judges would be more efficient.21 This statement 
expresses an unjustified bias against civil law which is actually as stable as in 
the common law courts.22 Among other criticisms that can be opposed to Pos-
ner’s analysis one can stress a misunderstanding of the sociology of civil law 
judges. Contrary to the argument that civil law judges are not used to the reali-
ty of business, one should note for instance that French bankruptcy judges are 
former businessmen, if not former bankers. Thus, they prove to be at least as 
served as common law judges in commercial and insolvency affairs. 
C. The quantitative effect of using questionable composite 
indicators 
Our working group studied how rating agencies take into account national dif-
ferences in corporate bankruptcy laws. Corporate bankruptcy law became a 
key issue during the Nineties with the rise of financial leverage instruments, in 
particular LBOs. We made a quantitative test on FitchRatings’ data which are 
easily available and which methodology relies heavily on a quantitative appro-
ach. FitchRatings provides useful and numerous documents to explain the 
links between corporate bankruptcy law and its “notching up” policy for the 
rating of financial instruments23. For instance, when a company launches a lo-
an, the agency proceeds the following way. The reference is the initial rating of 
the company, let us say B, then, according to the instrument characteristics 
(collateral nature…), this first rating can be notched up, for example rated B+, 
                                                
20 See KAUFMANN et al. (2005); MENARD and DU MARAIS (2006); HADFIELD et al. (2005). 
21
 POSNER (1998). 
22
 DEFFAINS (2005). 
23 FitchRatings (1999), Regimes, Recoveries and Loan Ratings: the importance of insolvency 
 legislation; FitchRatings (2006), Country Specific Treatment of Recovery Ratings – Revised. 
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BB- or even BB. The instrument rate can be increased up to three notches bey-
ond the initial rate of the company. The frequency and the extent of the not-
ching up depend on the assessment of the national corporate bankruptcy law. 
More precisely, the more creditor friendly a bankruptcy law is assessed, the 
higher are the extent and the frequency of the notching up24. In other words, 
the more the creditor friendliness of the bankruptcy law, the larger the probabi-
lity to obtain a higher rate than the initial one is. 
The difficulty consists in evaluating the degree of creditor friendliness of the 
law. The method consists in building a scale in order to distinguish clusters of 
country. These clusters are based on PHILIP WOOD / Allen & Overy LLP’s 
“Maps of World Financial Law”25 and World Bank’s governance indicators 
are used. It appears that these sources are questionable. 
For instance, first source gives account of “the general ethos” of the legal envi-
ronment. Two elements are taken into account: the legal family of the law26, 
and individual characteristics for each jurisdiction which measure creditor 
friendliness. A grade is alloted for each element, then a weighted average is 
calculated to give a first rating to assess the general legal environment. The 
agency states that this process accounts primarily for the membership to a legal 
family according to Wood’s maps. For instance, English common law is con-
sidered to be the most creditor friendly whereas Islamic laws are considered to 
be the least. One has to note that Wood’s maps are controverted among lawy-
ers27. 
Then three governance indicators provided by the World Bank are used: Go-
vernment Effectiveness, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption. A comple-
mentary source is also used: Doing Business’ reports. More precisely, the used 
variable is the indicator Time which measures proceedings length from the 
chapter intituled Closing a Business. A grade is allotted by FitchRatings to 
each of these indicators, then a weighted average is calculated. This rate is ai-
med at accounting for the effectiveness of law. 
                                                
24 One should note that this positive assessment for creditor friendly law is not justified by the 
agency in spite of its doubtful validity. To deal with this issue one can refer for instance 
among others: ATTIYAS (1995), Bankruptcy Policies: a Comparative Perspective, Working 
Paper, Private Sector Development department, The World Bank; EBERHART A.C. and SEN-
BET L.W. (1993), Absolute Priority Rule Violations and Risk Incentives for Financially Dis-
tressed Firms, Financial Management, vol.22, No. 3, p.101-116. 
25 WOOD PHILIP / Allen & Overy LLP (2005), Maps of World Financial Law. 
26 English common law, Napoleonic code, Us common law, Roman-Germanic code, mixed 
common law / civil code, islamic law et news states, CIS. 
27 F. ODITAH (1990), English and International Set-Off, Law Quaterly review, 106, p. 515-521. 
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The use of some of these indicators raises a few doubts. Their validity is called 
into question28 or they are built in a very subjective way, even according to 
their author29. We tried to assess the sensitivity of the rating with regard to the 
subjectivity of the indicators. In particular, we concentrated on the assessment 
of differences between French and American corporate bankruptcy law. In-
deed, both share a common prospect in favour of debtors (LLSV, 1998), as 
FitchRatings itself stresses. Moreover, in spite of belonging to a common law 
country, American bankruptcy law is governed by a code. We realized a parti-
tion by referring only to World Bank’s data, (thus, we did not take into account 
Wood’s maps) which leads to classify the two bankruptcy laws within the sa-
me class (see the first appendix). The initial ranking makes American 
bankruptcy law belong to class A, while French bankruptcy law belongs to 
class B and thus is submitted to a more severe notching policy, all other things 
being equal. If one refers to the standard scale used by the rating agencies, this 
severity can be assessed to lead to an average underestimation of at least 3.33 
percentage points for France30. 
This comparison shows that the simple use of questionable external indicators 
is not without consequences for the proposed ratings and can lead to unduly 
hamper the economic performance of enterprises by making financing conditi-
ons harsher (see the second appendix). Moreover, they can suffer in their ac-
cess to the financial markets from a confidence deficit from potential investors 
which would form their judgement on behalf of ratings proposed by rating a-
gencies. 
IV. Section IV: Conclusions 
Our research has confirmed two of the initial assumptions. CRAs do use in 
their methodology some composite index of the quality of law. Therefore, if 
these indexes are fraught with structural biases, these biases may diffuse 
through CRAs rating to operations in the financial markets and then create a 
competitive disadvantage to some issuers. 
                                                
28
 DU MARAIS B. (2006), Les limites méthodologiques des rapports Doing Business, document 
 de travail AED-2006-1. 
29
 WOOD, op cit. p. 13. 
30
 Indeed, rating agencies scale comprises 10 principal stages which can be broken up, thanks to 
 the notching up into three stages (for example, the stage B breaks up into B -, B and B+). On 
 a scale going from 1 to 100, each stage counts for 10 % of the maximum note, and each under 
 stage (correspondent with a one notch unit) accounts thus for 1/3*10 % that is to say: 3,33 % 
 of the maximum rate. 
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Secondly, there exists a “legal origins” bias in the rating process. 
We’ve tried to quantify this bias through a sensitivity test of one the CRAs 
rating process: namely, “Recovery rating”. We found this bias to have, on ave-
rage, a negative effect of one “notch” for French vehicles for structured finan-
ce. This bias is, at this stage of our research, merely due to the use of P. 
Wood’s indicator “Maps of World Financial Law”.31 By construction, these 
maps have a strong bias towards some legal culture (in favour of common law 
and, to a lesser extent, in favour of “Roman-Germanic law”, which is, surpris-
ingly, considered as very different from “Napoleonic Law”). 
However, we must admit that the focus on this indicator is largely accidental. 
We’ve chosen this indicator due to information availability. So this test can 
clearly not be considered as done on a significant sample of the CRAs metho-
dology. 
Through qualitative interviews and case studies, we’ve also identified some 
influence of the preference of CRAs for: a) statute law rather than case law, b) 
and in all cases, for common British or US law. 
In terms of financial market regulation, this shed a new light on the methodo-
logy of CRAs and its operational effect. First of all, this bias is, at least, neutral 
in terms of credit default assessment, when it is not negative. If the legal fra-
mework favoured by CRAs were outstandingly “better” than other legal arran-
gements or traditions, then this bias would have a positive effect in terms of 
certainty of the deal for investors. However, it is rare in the legal practice, that 
one can judge a legal arrangement far more reliable than another only by resor-
ting two criteria: a) the fact that it comes from an Official Gazette rather than 
from a Court record, b) the legal traditions in which it has been originated. 
Furthermore, there remains to be seen if the fact to recommend a foreign juris-
diction and law does not raise, by itself, some internal risks. These risks may 
especially happen when it comes to contracts implementation by the parties 
and to their enforcement in foreign courts. 
From a more macroscopic point of view, one may wonder if this bias is not 
comforting the integration of the financial industry, around the more preferred 
legal framework and not according to an objective assessment of its quality. 
By expressing a general preference, CRAs may actually constructing barriers 
to entry for legal arrangements coming from other legal framework. The same 
reasoning can be developed in terms of financial innovation. The legal prefe-
rences expressed by CRAs may actually discard legally innovative arrange-
                                                
31
 WOOD (2005). 
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ments based, for instance, on legal concepts used in fields different from their 
initial purpose (as was the case for “Comptes d’affectation speciale”). This is 
especially so when CRAs prefer statutory law. During the time necessary to 
pass an act, most of the issuances are postponed. 
From an academic point of view, these results may bring a nuance to the litera-
ture assessing the efficiency of certain legal jurisdictions to develop financial 
market. There might be a self fulfilling prophecy in these works, especially 
when they resort on CRAs data to assess the compared efficiency of financial 
law. Due to what seems a not enough scientifically based judgment, financial 
rating agencies are undervaluing the bonds and securities issued in markets 
belonging to the non-preferred legal traditions. Given their influence on the 
conditions of stock or bonds issuance, if not on their mere possibilities, one 
may wonder if CRAs are not participating in the overall judgement that com-
mon law is better for financial development, instead of demonstrating it. 
Further research could address the transaction cost of standing against this 
common shared opinion and then show how much the “Law and finance” theo-
ry, if tested today, is self fulfilling due to the biases we have identified. 
Further research should also test if our results can be generalized to several 
countries legal framework and to several types of rated entities. 
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Appendix
Result of the principal component analysis according to the WB indicators u-
sed by Fitch ratings 
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Differences between FitchRatings countries classification and the classificati-
on resulting from SPAD 
Pays Fitch Rank Spad Rank Increase Decrease
Belgium 2 1 1 0
France 2 1 1 0
Spain 2 1 1 0
Botswana 3 2 1 0
Bulgaria 3 2 1 0
Costa_Rica 3 2 1 0
Croatia 3 2 1 0
Estonia 3 2 1 0
Greece 3 2 1 0
Hungary 3 2 1 0
Israel 3 2 1 0
Jordan 3 2 1 0
Latvia 3 2 1 0
Lithuania 3 2 1 0
Malaysia 3 2 1 0
Mauritius 3 2 1 0
Morocco 3 2 1 0
Panama 3 2 1 0
Poland 3 2 1 0
Slovak_Republic 3 2 1 0
Slovenia 3 2 1 0
Thailand 3 2 1 0
Tunisia 3 2 1 0
Uruguay 3 2 1 0
Brazil 4 3 1 0
Chad 4 3 1 0
Ecuador 4 3 1 0
India 4 3 1 0
Kuwait 4 2 1 0
Oman 4 2 1 0
Saudi_Arabia 4 2 1 0
United_Arab_Emirates 4 2 1 0
Korea_South 1 2 0 1
Puerto_Rico 1 2 0 1
South_Africa 1 2 0 1
Taiwan 1 2 0 1
Mexico 3 4 0 1
Romania 3 4 0 1
